Crossing the Biotech ‘Valley of Death’: From Innovation to Cure

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Monday 6 September 2010 at 6:59 am

Jason Chew submits:

The term “Valley of Death” has come to describe the period of transition when a developing technology is deemed promising, but too new to validate its commercial potential and thereby attract the capital necessary for its continued development1. During this transition, there is often a funding gap due to the weariness of risk-adverse investors. This is especially true today with the depressed market, creating limited exit strategies for early investors.
Drug discovery often begins in academic research labs; many of today’s best selling and leading edge products have their roots in academia. These include Byetta, Copaxone, Geldanamycin, Emtriva, Alimta, Taxol, and Rapamycin. But the process of translating a laboratory discovery into a drug is fraught with difficulties. There is a tremendous gap between the time of the original discovery and the time to market.
Only 0.03% of VC funding goes into the seed stage due to the very high risk of failure2. For many researchers, the initial source of funding for discovery work often comes from the NIH in the form of SBIR grants. In bioscience research, the initial phase I grant can be around $150,000 for pilot research. The number of applicants for these grants has grown significantly in the past decades. In 1983, fewer than 1000 grants were sought, by 2006, there were more than 3000 applications; in that time period the percent approved remained between 20% and 30%, leaving an increasing number of applicants looking for alternative funding sources.
Universities and non-profit organizations (NGOs) also support early stage research, though for different reasons. Universities can receive millions of dollars in royalties if a product from their lab is developed. By spending small amounts and coaching their researchers, small investments may pay off handsomely in the long run. Many universities have formed technology transfer centers to help take discoveries from research labs to the hands of private companies for commercialization. NGOs typically invest in specific disease areas at an early stage in promising technologies to accelerate research toward the development of cures. Without pressure for financial payoffs, NGOs are able to take on these riskier investments.
The NIH also provides larger phase II grants of over $1 million each through the SBIR for proof of feasibility studies to assess the commercial viability of a project. Venture funding is often sought in conjunction with phase II grants. After these grants, the NIH provides no other funding for these projects. VC, angel investors, private equity, collaborations, or other government grants can all be sources of future financing.
Venture capital and biotechnology have worked hand in hand since the formation of Genentech and has been crucial to the development of the biotech industry. Between 1986 and 2008, VC biotech investors averaged net returns of 20.7%, although suffering a loss in 2008. In high risk biotech investing, 44% of VC investments ended in total or partial losses while two-thirds of winners required holding periods of five or more years3. Historically, about 18% of VC money has gone into the sector.
VC funding has dropped 33% in 2009 from 2007’s all time high, and investors have become especially conservative. While VCs have always tended to favor more de-risked assets- that is, after the proof-of-feasibility stage- they are now waiting even longer before pulling the trigger. This has left entrepreneurs in a bind, stuck between seed funding and VC funding. VCs are asking for ever-more data before investing, but money is needed to generate that data- a sticky situation indeed. Just at the point in development when costs are beginning to increase significantly, financing has become increasingly scarce4.
Money is flowing disproportionately to top-tier companies, with little left over for companies in the lower tiers. This has served to widen the chasm in the Valley of Death. There may be a renaissance in biotech VC investing, but until then, the industry may need to undergo some changes to ensure its continued growth.
The biotech sector is in serious need of consolidation and rationalization. Worldwide, there are 4000 private and 600 public biotechs, half of them in the US, very few profitable. In 2007, there were 2742 compounds in the clinical pipeline. Surely some redundancies can be eliminated. As we have seen, more compounds does not equate to more drugs approved. Not every idea is a good idea and deserves funding. Consolidation will ensure the best ideas will receive sufficient funding to succeed.
With the weeding out of biotechs that is likely to come (I say likely because biotechs have a way of hanging on like zombies), two business models look to strengthen in today’s business environment:
1) Hybrid biotechs with strong platform technologies, well financed, with the ability to take drugs to market. Hybrids will have strong IP in a broadly applicable enabling technology with the potential to create improved drugs. Hybrids both license this technology to others and use it to generate their own pipeline. They have a high burn rare from their operations, which is partially offset from their technology licensing.
2) Virtual biotechs are comprised of a core management team with completely outsourced operations, and maintain their focus on speed and cost, which fits well with the mindset of many VCs today.
Virtual biotechs may be well suited to take inventions from labs to a validated stage where additional capital can be found to complete development of a project. A validation point can be successfully developing a compound through Phase I or Phase II POC. Compared to laboratory startups, they have the advantage of strong management teams and the ability to lower risk by taking on multiple projects at once. Lean operations provide greater flexibility and a better chance of bringing a project to POC on a low budget. Most of all, they have the financial muscle to bridge the translation gap- the Valley of Death.
With virtual biotechs, there is no need to constantly form new companies for the purpose of developing a single invention- both risky and a highly inefficient use of resources. Spinning off a company from an academic institution requires the build up of infrastructure, no matter how small. The researcher also bears the cost and risk of a project’s failure, lacks expertise in navigating regulatory pathways, and management of outsourcing contracts. Allowing a dedicated drug development company to take over a project allows the academic researcher to offload significant risk while maintaining the ability to participate in the upside.
References:
  1. Venture Funding and the NIH SBIR Program, National Academies Press (US); 2009.
  2. Challenges in a Biotech Startup, Kellog School of Management 2006
  3. The Cost of Capital of Early Stage Biotechnology Ventures, Boston University, Harvard Universty
  4. Desperately Seeking Cures, Newsweek, May 15, 2010

Disclosure: Long RHHBY.PK

Complete Story »


Arena’s Lorcaserin: Weighed Down by Qnexa and Meridia

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Monday 6 September 2010 at 4:44 am

Joseph Krueger submits:

Before the FDA review panel’s of Vivus’s (VVUS) drug Qnexa, I expressed significant doubt that the panel review would be positive based primarily on the safety issues surrounding one of its ingredients topiramate here. The safety issues had to do with contraindications between topiramate itself as well as contraindications with the other ingredient phenteramine. I made the following statements:
  • With so many contraindications and side effects of phentermine and topiramate, who can safely use Qnexa?
  • Given the FDA’s historic stance on the safety of weight loss drugs, and the long list of potential safety issues with phentermine and topiramate, is it likely that the FDA will allow its marketing?
I concluded (accurately) that Qnexa efficacy was never in question, and that these safety concerns would be the outstanding issues that would prevent Qnexa approval (PDUFA date is Oct 28, 2010). After the review panel vote, it appears that the only hope for Qnexa approval in October is that the FDA feels the safety risks are worth the clear weight loss benefit.
Finally, I finished up this discussion with this statement:

Investors should also consider the effects of any VVUS events could have on other companies developing obesity drugs. The outcome of the Qnexa panel review will have an impact on the trading of Orexigen (OREX) and Arena Pharmaceuticals (ARNA) obesity drugs up for review before the end of the year.

In this brief analysis, I compared Orexigen’s (OREX) Contrave to Arena’s (ARNA) Lorcaserin and hypothesized how the Qnexa panel could affect the share prices of OREX and ARNA. I stated:

Between these three drugs, Qnexa is perhaps the most effective but also by far the one facing the most potential safety concerns. A favorable review for Qnexa is logically likely to rally VVUS but also OREX and especially ARNA stocks as it would demonstrate the review panel’s willingness to endorse an effective weight loss drug even in the face of potential side effects. An unfavorable Qnexa review is logically likely to cause a short term gut-response sell off in both of these stocks. However, a little further out I would expect ARNA not to recover (due to the safety concerns) but a rally in OREX could occur (due to its strong efficacy and very safe profile) as it demonstrates a continued concern over safety, and the elimination of its competitors.

Complete Story »


Another Big Bet on Obesity: Takeda Puts Orexigen on Solid Ground

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Sunday 5 September 2010 at 9:03 am

The Burrill Report submits:

By Michael Fitzhugh

Japan’s Takeda (TKPHF.PK) is placing summer’s second major bet on an obesity drug with a $50 million investment in Orexigen’s (OREX) Contrave, a combination drug meant to help people tackle the biology and behaviors behind overeating. Payments of more than $1 billion await Orexigen if it hits unspecified regulatory and sales-based milestones in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the countries covered by its new deal with Takeda.

Complete Story »


Genzyme, Sanofi May Eventually Come to Terms: Focus on Biotech Deals

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Sunday 5 September 2010 at 9:03 am

The Burrill Report submits:

By Marie Daghlian

Sanofi-Aventis (SNY) made a formal offer to acquire Genzyme (GENZ) for $69 per share, an offer that was unanimously rejected by Genzyme’s board of directors as unrealistic and opportunistic.

Complete Story »


Axial Capital Can’t Get Enough of QLT

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Sunday 5 September 2010 at 8:25 am

Market Folly submits:

Hedge fund Axial Capital Management seems to have an insatiable appetite for shares of QLT Inc (QLTI) at current levels. Eliav Assouline and Marc Andersen’s hedge fund firm has made the following acquisitions according to multiple SEC Form 4 filings:

August 26th: 50,000 shares @ $5.67
August 27th: 50,000 shares @ $5.78
August 30th: 7,400 shares @ $5.70
August 31st: 60,506 shares @ $5.75
September 1st: 5,318 shares @ $5.75

Complete Story »


Roche Plans Cutbacks on Pressure From Failures: Biotech’s Latest Mishaps

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Sunday 5 September 2010 at 1:33 am

The Burrill Report submits:

Swiss pharmaceutical giant Roche (RHHBY.PK), stung by recent setbacks and concerned about tightening healthcare budgets, said it will institute a cost-cutting plan. The company, which offered no detail on how deeply it would cut costs or where it would seek savings, said all parts of the organization are undergoing review and analysis and it would have specific measures in place and the potential impact on staffing by year end. The company said despite tightening healthcare budgets, it expects payers will increase allocations for treatments and diagnostic tools providing the highest medical value for patients. Part of its plan is to set the right priorities to ensure a success in the changing healthcare environment. Roche is awaiting a decision from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as to whether the agency will follow the recommendation of an advisory panel and revoke its approval of the use of its drug Avastin in breast cancer. Roche’s setbacks in recent months include its failure to expand the use of Avastin for gastric cancer, the inability to win priority review for its experimental drug T-DM1, and the scrapping of its Rituxan successor.

Celldex Therapeutics (CLDX) fell nearly 40 percent after it announced that Pfizer (PFE) has terminated its development and commercialization agreement for the cancer vaccine rindopepimut. Celldex will regain full worldwide rights November 1 to the therapeutic vaccine that targets the tumor-specific molecule EGFRvIII in patents with glioblastoma multiform, the most common form of brain cancer. Celldex and Pfizer Vaccines entered into a global development and commercialization agreement in April 2008 for rindopepimut. Pfizer told the company that the program is no longer a strategic priority for Pfizer. Celldex said rindopepimut has met or exceeded all pre-determined safety and efficacy objectives. The program has completed a multi-center phase 2 study, the development of a diagnostic companion product, the manufacture of drug supply for clinical studies, and the execution of discussions with regulatory agencies on the design of a global controlled study.

Complete Story »


Cadus: Buying a Dollar for 50 Cents, Literally

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Friday 3 September 2010 at 9:50 am

Stirling Capital Management submits:

KDUS: Cadus Corporation

Current Price: $1.43

Price Target: $1.80 – $2.40

Complete Story »


Cadus: Buying a Dollar for .50 Cents, Literally

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Friday 3 September 2010 at 7:14 am

Stirling Capital Management submits:

KDUS: Cadus Corporation

Current Price: $1.43

Price Target: $1.80 – $2.40

Complete Story »


A Look at Immunogen Beyond the T-DM1 Setback

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Friday 3 September 2010 at 3:36 am

Ohad Hammer submits:

The FDA’s decision to reject Roche’s (RHHBY.PK) filing for accelerated approval of T-DM1 had quite an impact on Immunogen’s (IMGN) stock. There is no doubt that T-DM1 represents the company’s most valuable program, even if it is in the form of a mid single digit royalty rate, due to its blockbuster potential and impressive clinical activity. This justifies to some extent last week’s market reaction, as the next potential approval for T-DM1 is anticipated in mid 2012. Nevertheless, T-DM1 is facing multiple potential value creation events in the coming year, including an important data set for T-DM1 next month. In addition, the company is involved in 6 clinical stage programs (#7 is expected to enter the clinic this month), some of which are expected to generate data in the coming months. Although none of these programs is nearly as exciting as T-DM1, some of them could become more attractive with time.

T-DM1 related events

Complete Story »


Arena Pharma: Understanding the Market for Anti-Obesity Drugs

Posted under BIOTECH by admin on Friday 3 September 2010 at 3:24 am

John Tucker submits:

The potential market for anti-obesity drugs is enormous, but no drug in this class has ever achieved blockbuster status[1]. Understanding the factors that have limited the commercial success of existing products is critical to developing accurate revenue projections for emerging anti-obesity drugs. This article analyzes the world market for anti-obesity drugs to identify these barriers. The properties of lorcaserin and other emerging anti-obesity drugs are then examined to determine whether these new agents will be able to overcome these barriers, expand the current market, and achieve blockbuster status.
Market Penetration is Poor Even When Patient Costs are Reimbursed
In 2009 the patented anti-obesity drugs Xenical, Alli, and Meridia each had worldwide sales of $300M to $350M. An additional $300M to $600M in sales were generated by generic products including phentermine, amphetamines, and sibutramine.
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of obesity and the 2008 per capita pharmaceutical spending (across all indications) of several developed and developing countries[2]. The US is a key potential market for anti-obesity drugs as shown by its unique position on the plot. The obese population in the US exceeds that of France, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia, Canada, and Japan combined. Its ability and willingness to pay for pharmaceutical products is demonstrated by its per capita expenditure of $900.
Click to enlarge images
Figure 1. Per Capita Pharmaceutical Spending and Absolute Incidence of Obesity
Table 1 shows estimates for 2008 total sales of anti-obesity drugs, market penetration, and the average cost of one year of anti-obesity drug therapy in the US and three other major western pharmaceutical markets[3]. The key observations from this data are:
  • The overall market penetrations of <1% are remarkably low, especially compared with the estimated 50% US market penetration of the highly successful statin class.
  • The market penetration of patented prescription anti-obesity drugs is especially low in the key US market. Two-thirds of US patients are treated with generic phentermine, which is not available in the European Union.
  • Market penetration is 0.7% in the UK, the only major pharmaceutical market where patients are routinely reimbursed for anti-obesity drug costs. This modest market penetration suggests that factors other than patient cost strongly limit market penetration.

Market Penetration is Low Because Patients Stop Taking Their Pills
Studies performed using insurance company and national healthcare databases in the US[4], Canada[5], the UK[6], New Zealand[7], and the Netherlands[8] show that most patients starting anti-obesity therapy drug will stop taking pills within 90 days. Less than 10% of patients remain on therapy for a year or more. Dropout rates are similar for all currently marketed anti-obesity drugs, and remain high when patients are reimbursed for the cost of treatment[4,6].
The statins are an extremely successful class of chronically used drugs, and thus serve as a useful benchmark for understanding the effect of patient dropout on anti-obesity drug sales. About 25% of patients starting statin therapy will stop taking pills within 90 days, and 60% remain on therapy for a year or more[9]. Figure 2 compares the percentage of statin and anti-obesity drug patients remaining on therapy in the 12 months after filling their first prescription.
Figure 2. Percent of Patients Remaining on Therapy Over 1 Year
The growth of Lipitor prescriptions in the US from 1997 to 2005 (the last year prior to the availability of generic simvastatin) is reproduced reasonably well using a simple mathematical model incorporating these dropout rates and a fixed monthly rate of new patient recruitment (Figure 3)[10]. When dropout rates are higher, sales plateau sooner and at a lower level. The brown line in Figure 3 shows the US sales growth of a hypothetical drug having a new patient acquisition rate similar to that of Lipitor and a patient dropout rate typical of marketed anti-obesity drugs. Peak sales are reduced by 90% relative to those of Lipitor. Lipitor’s peak worldwide sales of $13B suggest an upper limit of $1.3B for worldwide sales that can be achieved for a drug with these high dropout rates.
Figure 3. The Effect of High Patient Dropout Rate on Sales Development
Xenical sales peaked at $612M during its second year on the market. In the ensuing years they have averaged about $500M. The sales development of this product fits a model incorporating a high initial rate of new patient acquisition and rapid patient dropout. New patient acquisition rates then declined, reducing sales. This decline most likely resulted from growing physician disenchantment with high patient dropout rates.
High Discontinuation Rates Appear to be Due to Inadequate Efficacy
Figure 4 shows the dropout rates for treated and placebo groups in one-year clinical trials of currently marketed and developmental obesity drugs[11]. Dropout rates are normally lower in the clinical trial setting than in community practice because trial sponsors cover the costs of treatment, exclude subjects who are likely to be non-compliant, and take active measures to retain enrolled subjects. Despite this, anti-obesity drug clinical trials typically have dropout rates of 40% to 50%. These rates are higher than those observed for statins in clinical trials or in community practice.
Drug side effects are responsible for only 16% to 46% of dropouts in the drug-treatment groups shown in Figure 4. The average across the series is 28%. Placebo dropout rates are similar to or higher than those of treated patients. Thus only a minority of dropouts is due to drug side effects.
Figure 4. Patient Dropout Rates in Anti-Obesity Drug Clinical Trials

The rate of these “other” clinical trial dropouts (those not due to drug side effects) is plotted versus efficacy in Figure 5. On average, each additional 1% weight loss reduces the one year dropout rate by 2% (p<0.05). To achieve statin-like total dropout rates, an anti-obesity drug with minimal side effects must provide weight loss of at least 10%.
Figure 5. Non-Side Effect Dropouts vs. Efficacy in Clinical Trials
In summary, these data suggest that generic competition in the US, non-reimbursement of treatment expenses, and patient dropout are critical factors limiting the commercial success of currently marketed anti-obesity drugs. Patient dropout appears to be the most important of these. Multiple lines of evidence suggest that dropouts are primarily due to the modest efficacy of currently marketed products. Mega-blockbuster sales are unlikely to be achieved with products providing less than 10% weight loss.
Predicting the Success of Developmental Anti-Obesity Drugs
The analysis above suggests that the anti-obesity drugs currently awaiting FDA approval will not dramatically expand the market and achieve mega-blockbuster status. As incremental improvements over existing drugs, they are likely to achieve sales by taking market share from existing products and modestly increasing overall market penetration. Their limited efficacy suggests that they will not escape the historical pattern of new anti-obesity drug introductions, in which high patient dropout rates lead to sales that rapidly plateau and then decline.
The main competition for new anti-obesity products will be phentermine, Xenical, and Alli in the US, and Xenical and Alli in the European Union. Meridia was withdrawn from the European Union market in early 2010, and withdrawal in the US appears likely as well. In 2009, US sales of phentermine were $145M. Worldwide 2009 sales of Meridia, Xenical, and Alli were $300M, $345M, and $317M, respectively.
Lorcaserin’s efficacy is similar to that of Xenical. It exerts a slightly more favorable effect on serum markers of metabolic syndrome, and a slightly less favorable effect on cardiovascular parameters such as blood pressure and pulse rate[12]. Xenical improves serum metabolic parameters and reduces use of anti-hyperglycemic medications in diabetic patients, as well as reducing the rate at which pre-diabetic patients progress to frank diabetes12. In spite of these findings, Roche has been unable to obtain widespread reimbursement for Xenical in markets other than the UK. Lorcaserin is likely to encounter similar difficulties.
Xenical has distasteful gastrointestinal side effects including flatulence, diarrhea, and fecal incontinence, especially in patients who fail to follow the recommended low fat diet. Surprisingly, the available evidence suggests that relatively few patients stop taking Xenical because of these side effects. The overall and side effect- related clinical trial dropout rates for Xenical are similar to those of other anti-obesity drugs (including lorcaserin), and lower than those of placebo. In community practice, Xenical dropout rates are indistinguishable from or slightly lower than those of other marketed anti-obesity drugs. Xenical’s reputation for causing gastrointestinal side effects may reduce the number of initial prescriptions written, but data bearing on this question are not readily available.
The $660M in 2009 sales generated by Xenical and Alli form a useful benchmark for estimating the peak sales potential of lorcaserin. The overall properties of lorcaserin are superior to those of Xenical and Alli, and lorcaserin is likely to benefit from the initial burst of enthusiasm that typically greets newly introduced anti-obesity drugs. The withdrawal of Meridia from important international markets puts an additional $300M or so in potential sales in play. Assuming a modest expansion of the overall market, peak lorcaserin sales of $800M to $1.0B seem readily achievable. Historical precedent and the data presented in this article suggest, however, that these peak sales will decline by 20% or more within a few years. Because the size of the US market is limited by generic competition, obtaining marketing approval in the European Union will be absolutely critical in achieving these sales levels.
The author warmly thanks Dr. Jean Pierre Gelinas MD for many vigorous, challenging, and informative discussions of this topic. The opinions expressed by the author in this article are not necessarily those of Dr. Gelinas.



[1] Although widely cited as an example of a blockbuster drug, Fen-Phen never came close to the billion dollar sales mark. Phentermine was a generic drug at the time of the Fen-Phen craze. Fenfluramine (Pondimin) sales peaked at $173M in 1996.
[2] US data for pharmaceutical spending is from IMS and is believed comprehensive. Data for pharmacetutical spending by in other developed economies is from the OECD database accessed online here and may underestimate actual spending. Pharmaceutical spending data for developing countries was taken from Anderson T, Das I, Olson J, Sobelman D. Assessment of opportunities for pharmaceutical manufacturers in developing markets. J. of Managed Care Pharmacy 2009; 15(5): 396-402.
[3] a) Arena Pharmaceuticals Barclays Capital 2010 Global Healthcare Conference, March 23, 2010.
b) IMS Health, Out of pocket spending: the emerging cash market in the EU5. Accessed here (pdf).
c) UK National Health Service, here.
[4] Bolen SD, Clark JM, Richards TM, Shore AD, Goodwin SM Weiner JP. Trends and patterns of obesity medication use in an insured cohort. Obesity 2010; 18(1): 206-209.
[5] Padwal R, Kezouh A, Levine M, Etminan M. Long term persistence with orlistat and sibutramine in a population-based cohort. Int. J. Obesity 2007; 31:1567-1570.
[6] Perrio MJ, Wilton LV, Shakir AW. The safety profiles of orlistat and sibutramine: Results of prescription-event monitoring studies in England. Obesity 2007; 15(11):2712-2722.
[7] Hill GR, Ashton J, Harrison-Woolrych M. Sibutramine Usage in New Zealand: an analysis of prescription data by the Intensive Medicines Monitoring Programme. Pharmacoepidemiol. Drug Safety 2007; 16: 1217-1226.
[8] Willemen MJC, Mantel-Teeuwisse AK, Straus SMJM, Leufkens HGM, Egberts ACG, Sturkenboom CJM. Cardiovascular and psychiatric risk profile and patterns of use in patients starting anti-obesity drugs. Pharmacoepidemiol. Drug Safety 2009; 18: 631-638.
[9] a) Perreault S, Blais L, Dragomir A, Bouchard M-H, Lalonde L, Laurier C, Collin J. Persistence and determinants of statin therapy among middle-aged patients free of cardiovascular disease. Eur. J. Clin. Pharmacol. 2005; 61:667-674.
b) Yeaw J, Benner JS, Walt JG, Sian S, Smith DB. Comparing adherence and persistence across 6 chronic medication classes. J. Managed Care Pharm. 2009; 15(9): 728-740.
[10] In this model the number of patients filling a prescription each month is equal to the number of new patients on therapy at the beginning of the month plus the number of new patients recruited during the month minus the number of patients stopping therapy during the month. The number of patients stopping therapy each month is the sum of two terms. One is a fraction of the total number of patients on therapy at the beginning of the month. The other is a fraction of the number of patients recruited during the previous 3 months. The fractional values are obtained from the studies referenced in the text and the rate of new patient recruitment is optimized to give the best fit to empirical TRx data.
[11] a) Meridia: Smith IG, Goulder MA. Randomized placebo-controlled trial of long-term treatment with sibutramine in mild to moderate obesity. J. Family Practice 2001; 56(6): 505-512.
b) Acomplia: Van Gaal LF, Rissanen Am, Scheen AJ, Ziegler O, Rossner S. Effects of the cannabanoid-1 receptor blocker rimonabant on weight reduction and cardiovascular risk factors in overweight patients: 1-year experience from the RIO Europe Study. Lancet 2005; 365: 1389-1397.
c) Contrave: Greenway FL, Fujioka K, Plodowski RA, Mudaliar S, Erickson J et al. Effect of naltrexone plus bupropion on weight loss in overweight and obese adults (COR-1): a multicenter, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial. Lancet 2010; 376: 595-605.
d) Orlistat: Hauptman J, Lucas C, Boldrin MN Collins H. Orlistat in the long-term treatment of obesity in primary care settings. Arch. Fam. Med. 2000; 160-167.
e) Lorcaserin: Smith SR, Weissman NJ, Anderson CM, Sanchez M Chuang E et al. Multicenter placebo-controlled trial of lorcaserin for weight management. NEJM 2010; 245-256.
f) Qnexa: Vivus (VVUS) corporate press release September 9, 2009.
[12] Data taken from the Xenical package insert and reference 10e.

Disclosure: Long OREX (<1% of portfolio)

Complete Story »


Next Page »
zinwave Wordpress Theme